We present a non-cooperative union-firm wage bargaining model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout if a proposed wage contract is rejected. The innovative element that our model brings to the existing literature on wage bargaining concerns the parties’ preferences which are not expressed by constant discount rates, but by sequences of discount factors varying in time. First, we determine subgame perfect equilibria if the strike decision of the union is exogenous. We analyze...
The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on a certain
issue. We assume that each agent is inclined to make a particular decision, but due to a
possible influence of the others, his final decision may be different from his initial
inclination. Since in reality the influence does not necessarily stop after one step, but
may iterate, we present a model which allows us to study the dynamic of influence. An
innovative...
The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on a certain
issue. We assume that each agent is inclined to make a particular decision, but due to a
possible influence of the others, his final decision may be different from his initial
inclination. Since in reality the influence does not necessarily stop after one step, but
may iterate, we present a model which allows us to study the dynamic of influence. An
innovative...
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