Some possibilities of fuzzification of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) are briefly investigated. The fuzzification based on the transformation of individual fuzzy TU game into a fuzzy class of (deterministic) TU games with their own specific solutions is discussed.
There exist several possibilities of fuzzification of a coalitional game. It is quite usual to fuzzify, e. g., the concept of coalition, as it was done in [1]. Another possibility is to fuzzify the expected pay-offs, see [3, 4]. The latter possibility is dealt even here. We suppose that the coalitional and individual pay-offs are expected only vaguely and this uncertainty on the input'' of the game rules is reflected also by an uncertainty of the derived output'' concept like superadditivity, core,...
Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases...
The structures of the fuzzy information theory are focused on the concept of fuzzy entropy, where the individual information of symbols is considered only implicitely. This paper aims to fill this gap and to study the concepts of fuzzy information. Special attention is paid to the typical fuzzy set theoretical paradigma of monotonicity of operations.
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