Displaying similar documents to “On plain absolute equilibrium points in general non-ordered games with perfect information. I”

Bilateral sequential bargaining with perfect information and different protocols

Robert Golański (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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Most research done in the bargaining literature concentrates on the situations in which players get to be proposers alternately, with the first player being the proposer in the first period, the second player being the proposer in the second period, and so on until the cycle ends and the order of proposers is repeated. However, allowing for only this kind of order is a rather simplifying assumption. This paper looks at the situation in which we allow for much more general kind of protocols....

Banach-Mazur game played in partially ordered sets

Wiesław Kubiś (2016)

Banach Center Publications

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Concepts, definitions, notions, and some facts concerning the Banach-Mazur game are customized to a more general setting of partial orderings. It is applied in the theory of Fraïssé limits and beyond, obtaining simple proofs of universality of certain objects and classes.

Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions

Ahmet ozkardas, Agnieszka rusinowska (2014)

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle

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We present a non-cooperative union-firm wage bargaining model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout if a proposed wage contract is rejected. The innovative element that our model brings to the existing literature on wage bargaining concerns the parties’ preferences which are not expressed by constant discount rates, but by sequences of discount factors varying in time. First, we determine subgame perfect equilibria if the strike decision of the union is exogenous....