Displaying similar documents to “Design of a Participatory Decision Making Agent Architecture Based on Argumentation and Influence Function – Application to a Serious Game about Biodiversity Conservation”

Modern approaches to modeling user requirements on resource and task allocation in hierarchical computational grids

Joanna Kołodziej, Fatos Xhafa (2011)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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Tasks scheduling and resource allocation are among crucial issues in any large scale distributed system, including Computational Grids (CGs). These issues are commonly investigated using traditional computational models and resolution methods that yield near-optimal scheduling strategies. One drawback of such approaches is that they cannot effectively tackle the complex nature of CGs. On the one hand, such systems account for many administrative domains with their own access policies,...

Evolving small-board Go players using coevolutionary temporal difference learning with archives

Krzysztof Krawiec, Wojciech Jaśkowski, Marcin Szubert (2011)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We apply Coevolutionary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL) to learn small-board Go strategies represented as weighted piece counters. CTDL is a randomized learning technique which interweaves two search processes that operate in the intra-game and inter-game mode. Intra-game learning is driven by gradient-descent Temporal Difference Learning (TDL), a reinforcement learning method that updates the board evaluation function according to differences observed between its values for consecutively...

The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...