Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games
Anton Stefanescu (1996)
Kybernetika
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Anton Stefanescu (1996)
Kybernetika
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Milan Mareš (1978)
Kybernetika
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Rafael Amer, José Miguel Giménez (2009)
RAIRO - Operations Research
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Two games are inseparable by semivalues if both games obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension...
Milan Mareš (1981)
Kybernetika
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Mesdal, G.A., Ottaway, P. (2007)
Integers
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Vladica Andrejić (2009)
Publications de l'Institut Mathématique
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Hans Keiding (2006)
Banach Center Publications
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The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of...