Displaying similar documents to “Banach-Mazur game played in partially ordered sets”

An axiomatization of the aspiration core

Hans Keiding (2006)

Banach Center Publications

Similarity:

The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of...

Analysis and improvement attempt of prof. Alan Fowler's negotiation game

Jakub Jan Golik (2018)

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis | Studia ad Didacticam Mathematicae Pertinentia

Similarity:

The main goal of the following article is to design an improved version of the negotiation game created by prof. Alan Fowler (Fowler, 1997). I have tried to achieve this by constructing four separate versions of the game which represent different approaches while preserving rules, chosen basic technical assumptions and the simplicity of the base game. Each version of the game is supposed to i.a. make it less obvious, create new negotiation possibilities (including potential cooperation),...

Some values for constant-sum and bilateral cooperative games

Andrzej Młodak (2007)

Applicationes Mathematicae

Similarity:

We prove new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition as well as on nonnegative bilateral games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition. A characteristic feature of the latter class of cooperative games is that for such a game any coalition and its complement in the set of all players have the same worth. The axiomatizations are then generalized to the entire class of...

Axiomatization of values of cooperative games using a fairness property

Andrzej Młodak (2005)

Applicationes Mathematicae

Similarity:

We propose new systems of axioms which characterize four types of values of cooperative games: the Banzhaf value, the Deegan-Packel value, the least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. The common element used in these axiomatizations is a fairness property. It requires that if to a cooperative game we add another game in which two given players are symmetric, then their payoffs change by the same amount. In our analysis we will use an idea applied by R. van den Brink...

Method of construction of the evasion strategy for differential games with many pursuers

Witold Rzymowski

Similarity:

CONTENTSIntroduction...........................................................................51. Preliminaries.....................................................................6 1.1. Notation........................................................................6 1.2. Control systems. Strategies..........................................72. Main lemma......................................................................93. Avoidance of many pursuers..........................................14 3.1....

New axiomatizations of values of TU-games using reduction properties

Andrzej Młodak (2013)

Applicationes Mathematicae

Similarity:

We propose new axiomatizations of values of cooperative games where traditional properties connected with special players (dummy, null or zero) are replaced with weaker properties relating to such participants of the game. We assume that the change of payoff of a player when combining the game with another game where this player is special is constant. Using such axioms with an additional assumption that a value is odd and-if necessary-the fairness axioms holds, one can obtain axiomatizations...

A dichotomy on Schreier sets

Robert Judd (1999)

Studia Mathematica

Similarity:

We show that the Schreier sets S α ( α < ω 1 ) have the following dichotomy property. For every hereditary collection ℱ of finite subsets of ℱ, either there exists infinite M = ( m i ) i = 1 ∞ ⊆ ℕ such that S α ( M ) = m i : i ∈ E : E ∈ S α ⊆ ℱ , or there exist infinite M = ( m i ) i = 1 ∞ , N ⊆ ℕ such that ℱ [ N ] ( M ) = m i : i ∈ F : F ∈ ℱ a n d F ⊂ N ⊆ S α .