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Displaying similar documents to “Bayesian Propositional Logic”

Inference in conditional probability logic

Niki Pfeifer, Gernot D. Kleiter (2006)

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An important field of probability logic is the investigation of inference rules that propagate point probabilities or, more generally, interval probabilities from premises to conclusions. Conditional probability logic (CPL) interprets the common sense expressions of the form “if ..., then ...” by conditional probabilities and not by the probability of the material implication. An inference rule is probabilistically informative if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is...

(Pure) logic out of probability.

Ton Sales (1996)

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Today, Logic and Probability are mostly seen as independent fields with a separate history and set of foundations. Against this dominating perception, only a very few people (Laplace, Boole, Peirce) have suspected there was some affinity or relation between them. The truth is they have a considerable common ground which underlies the historical foundation of both disciplines and, in this century, has prompted notable thinkers as Reichenbach [14], Carnap [2] [3] or Popper [12] [13] (and...

Foundations of subjective probability and decision making: Discussion.

Irving John Good, Ludovico Piccinato, Cesáreo Villegas, James M. Dickey, Morris H. DeGroot, Donald A. S. Fraser, Simon French, Dennis V. Lindley (1980)

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Discussion on the papers by Girón, F. J. and Ríos, S., Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to dicision making? and by Hill, B. M., On finite additivity, non-conglomerability and statistical paradoxes, both of them part of a round table on Foundations of Subjective Probability and Decision Making held in the First International Congress on Bayesian Methods (Valencia, Spain, 28 May - 2 June 1979).

The Phenomenology of Second-Level Inference: Perfumes in The Deductive Garden

David Makinson (2020)

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We comment on certain features that second-level inference rules commonly used in mathematical proof sometimes have, sometimes lack: suppositions, indirectness, goal-simplification, goal-preservation and premise-preservation. The emphasis is on the roles of these features, which we call 'perfumes', in mathematical practice rather than on the space of all formal possibilities, deployment in proof-theory, or conventions for display in systems of natural deduction.

Qualitative reasoning in Bayesian networks.

Paolo Garbolino (1996)

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Some probabilistic inference rules which can be compared with the inference rules of preferential logic are given and it will be shown how they work in graphical models, allowing qualitative plausible reasoning in Bayesian networks.

The Dawning of the Age of Stochasticity

David Mumford (2000)

Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di Scienze Fisiche, Matematiche e Naturali. Rendiconti Lincei. Matematica e Applicazioni

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For over two millennia, Aristotle's logic has ruled over the thinking of western intellectuals. All precise theories, all scientific models, even models of the process of thinking itself, have in principle conformed to the straight-jacket of logic. But from its shady beginnings devising gambling strategies and counting corpses in medieval London, probability theory and statistical inference now emerge as better foundations for scientific models, especially those of the process of thinking...