Displaying similar documents to “(Pure) logic out of probability.”

Between logic and probability.

Ton Sales (1994)

Mathware and Soft Computing

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Logic and Probability, as theories, have been developed quite independently and, with a few exceptions (like Boole's), have largely ignored each other. And nevertheless they share a lot of similarities, as well a considerable common ground. The exploration of the shared concepts and their mathematical treatment and unification is here attempted following the lead of illustrious researchers (Reichenbach, Carnap, Popper, Gaifman, Scott & Krauss, Fenstad, Miller, David Lewis, Stalnaker,...

From two- to four-valued logic

Chris Brink (1993)

Banach Center Publications

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The purpose of this note is to show that a known and natural four-valued logic co-exists with classical two-valued logic in the familiar context of truth tables. The tool required is the power construction.

Inference in conditional probability logic

Niki Pfeifer, Gernot D. Kleiter (2006)

Kybernetika

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An important field of probability logic is the investigation of inference rules that propagate point probabilities or, more generally, interval probabilities from premises to conclusions. Conditional probability logic (CPL) interprets the common sense expressions of the form “if ..., then ...” by conditional probabilities and not by the probability of the material implication. An inference rule is probabilistically informative if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is...

Logic of existence and logic of knowledge. Epistemic and non epistemic aspects of logic

Michel Bourdeau (2003)

Philosophia Scientiae

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Contrairement à ce qui a parfois été dit, la logique classique et la logique intuitionniste ne s’opposent pas comme une logique de l’existence à une logique de la connaissance. Les considérations épistémologiques trouvent naturellement leur place dans le cadre de la logique classique, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de faire intervenir aucun principe intuitionniste ; il suffit pour cela de reconnaître que la logique ne peut se passer de la notion d’assertion, ou si l’on préfère de jugement....