Règles positionnelles itératives, principe majoritaire et préférences unimodales

Dominique Lepelley; Laurent Vidu

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle (2000)

  • Volume: 34, Issue: 3, page 347-362
  • ISSN: 0399-0559

How to cite

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Lepelley, Dominique, and Vidu, Laurent. "Règles positionnelles itératives, principe majoritaire et préférences unimodales." RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle 34.3 (2000): 347-362. <http://eudml.org/doc/105224>.

@article{Lepelley2000,
author = {Lepelley, Dominique, Vidu, Laurent},
journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle},
keywords = {scoring rules; social choice; Condorcet winner},
language = {fre},
number = {3},
pages = {347-362},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
title = {Règles positionnelles itératives, principe majoritaire et préférences unimodales},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/105224},
volume = {34},
year = {2000},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Lepelley, Dominique
AU - Vidu, Laurent
TI - Règles positionnelles itératives, principe majoritaire et préférences unimodales
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle
PY - 2000
PB - EDP-Sciences
VL - 34
IS - 3
SP - 347
EP - 362
LA - fre
KW - scoring rules; social choice; Condorcet winner
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/105224
ER -

References

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  1. D. BLACK, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making. J. Political Economy 56 (1948) 23-34. 
  2. C. COOMBS, Theory of Data. Wiley, New York (1954). Zbl0058.13704MR66616
  3. P.C. FISHBURN, Aspects of One-Stage Voting Rules. Management Sci. 21 (1974) 422-427. 
  4. W.V. GEHRLEIN, Condorcet's Paradox and the Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules. Math. Japon. 45 (1997) 173-179. Zbl0869.90013MR1434971
  5. T. HARE, Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal. Longmans Green, London (1859). 
  6. D. LEPELLEY, Condorcet Efficiency of Positional Voting Rules with Single-peaked Preferences. Econom. Design 1 (1995) 289-299. 
  7. D. LEPELLEY, Constant Scoring Rules, Condorcet Criteria and Single-peaked Preferences. Econ. Theory 7 (1996) 491-500. Zbl0858.90004MR1393585
  8. D. LEPELLEY et V. MERLIN, Choix Social Positionnel et Principe Majoritaire. Ann. Économ. Statist. 51 (1998) 29-48. MR1806094
  9. H. MOULIN, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press (1988). Zbl0699.90001MR1113263
  10. E. J. NANSON, Methods of Election, Trans. Proc. of Roy. Soc. Victoria 18 (1882) 197-240. 
  11. J. H. SMITH, Agregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate. Econometrica 41 (1973) 1027-1041. Zbl0286.90008MR441227

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