Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales

Dominique Lepelley; Laurent Vidu

RAIRO - Operations Research (2010)

  • Volume: 34, Issue: 3, page 347-362
  • ISSN: 0399-0559

Abstract

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Sequential scoring rules are multi-stage social choice tules that work as follows: at each stage of the process, a score is computed for each alternative by taking into account its position in the individual preference rankings, and the alternative with the lowest score is eliminated. The current paper studies the ability of these rules for choosing the Condorcet winner (or the strong Condorcet winner) when individual preferences are single-peaked.

How to cite

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Lepelley, Dominique, and Vidu, Laurent. "Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales." RAIRO - Operations Research 34.3 (2010): 347-362. <http://eudml.org/doc/197808>.

@article{Lepelley2010,
abstract = { Sequential scoring rules are multi-stage social choice tules that work as follows: at each stage of the process, a score is computed for each alternative by taking into account its position in the individual preference rankings, and the alternative with the lowest score is eliminated. The current paper studies the ability of these rules for choosing the Condorcet winner (or the strong Condorcet winner) when individual preferences are single-peaked. },
author = {Lepelley, Dominique, Vidu, Laurent},
journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research},
keywords = {Choix social; régles de vote; critère de Condorcet; unimodalité; scoring rules; social choice; Condorcet winner},
language = {eng},
month = {3},
number = {3},
pages = {347-362},
publisher = {EDP Sciences},
title = {Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/197808},
volume = {34},
year = {2010},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Lepelley, Dominique
AU - Vidu, Laurent
TI - Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research
DA - 2010/3//
PB - EDP Sciences
VL - 34
IS - 3
SP - 347
EP - 362
AB - Sequential scoring rules are multi-stage social choice tules that work as follows: at each stage of the process, a score is computed for each alternative by taking into account its position in the individual preference rankings, and the alternative with the lowest score is eliminated. The current paper studies the ability of these rules for choosing the Condorcet winner (or the strong Condorcet winner) when individual preferences are single-peaked.
LA - eng
KW - Choix social; régles de vote; critère de Condorcet; unimodalité; scoring rules; social choice; Condorcet winner
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/197808
ER -

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