Sur l'équilibre fort selon Berge
RAIRO - Operations Research (2010)
- Volume: 35, Issue: 4, page 439-451
- ISSN: 0399-0559
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top- R. Aumann, Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n- Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games 4. Princeton University Press (1959).
- C. Berge, Théorie général des jeux à n- personnes. Gauthier Villars, Paris (1957).
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