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Estrategias óptimas de un juego bipersonal de suma cero y puntos de ensilladura del campo escalar asociado.

Josep Freixas Bosch — 1993

Qüestiió

Definimos el campo escalar asociado a un juego bipersonal de suma cero. Estudiamos la existencia y unicidad de puntos estacionarios y obtenemos la forma general de los mismos en caso de unicidad. Se establece que todo punto estacionario es de ensilladura. La importancia del estudio anterior queda reflejada al establecer la equivalencia entre las estrategias óptimas simples de un juego y los puntos estacionarios del campo escalar asociado. El Teorema de Shapley-Snow [2] proporciona...

On the complexity of problems on simple games

Josep FreixasXavier MolineroMartin OlsenMaria Serna — 2011

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand. Each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation...

Amplitude of weighted majority game strict representations.

Some real situations which may be described as weighted majority games can be modified when some players increase or decrease their weights and/or the quota is modified. Nevertheless, some of these modifications do not change the game. In the present work we shall estimate the maximal percentage variations in the weights and the quota which may be allowed without changing the game (amplitude). For this purpose we have to use strict representations of weighted majority games.

On the complexity of problems on simple games

Josep FreixasXavier MolineroMartin OlsenMaria Serna — 2012

RAIRO - Operations Research

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand. Each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of games....

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