Displaying similar documents to “Sentences with three quantifiers are decidable in set theory”

New axiomatizations of values of TU-games using reduction properties

Andrzej Młodak (2013)

Applicationes Mathematicae

Similarity:

We propose new axiomatizations of values of cooperative games where traditional properties connected with special players (dummy, null or zero) are replaced with weaker properties relating to such participants of the game. We assume that the change of payoff of a player when combining the game with another game where this player is special is constant. Using such axioms with an additional assumption that a value is odd and-if necessary-the fairness axioms holds, one can obtain axiomatizations...

On convex combinations of two values

Andrzej Nowak, Tadeusz Radzik (1996)

Applicationes Mathematicae

Similarity:

We study values for cooperative TU-games which are convex combinations of the Shapley value and the solidarity value, introduced in our recent paper [1]. First, we axiomatize the convex combination of the two values in the case when the coefficients are given exogenously. Next, we give an axiomatic description of the whole family of such values.

A value based on marginal contributions for multi–alternative games with restricted coalitions

Satoshi Masuya, Masahiro Inuiguchi (2010)

Kybernetika

Similarity:

This paper deals with cooperative games with n players and r alternatives which are called multi-alternative games. In the conventional multi-alternative games initiated by Bolger, each player can choose any alternative with equal possibilities. In actual social life, there exist situations in which players have some restrictions on their choice of alternatives. Considering such situations, we study restricted multi-alternative games. A value for a given game is proposed.

An axiomatization of the aspiration core

Hans Keiding (2006)

Banach Center Publications

Similarity:

The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of...