Contractual -core and equilibrium allocations.
Vasil'ev, V.A. (2004)
Journal of Mathematical Sciences (New York)
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Vasil'ev, V.A. (2004)
Journal of Mathematical Sciences (New York)
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V. M. MARAKULIN (1999)
Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas Físicas y Naturales
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Wang, Sanhua, Li, Qiuying (2011)
Fixed Point Theory and Applications [electronic only]
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Nikodem, Kazimierz, Popa, Dorian (2008)
Banach Journal of Mathematical Analysis [electronic only]
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Liang-Ju Chu, Ching-Yan Lin (2002)
Discussiones Mathematicae, Differential Inclusions, Control and Optimization
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In 1959, Nikaidô established a remarkable coincidence theorem in a compact Hausdorff topological space, to generalize and to give a unified treatment to the results of Gale regarding the existence of economic equilibrium and the theorems in game problems. The main purpose of the present paper is to deduce several generalized key results based on this very powerful result, together with some KKM property. Indeed, we shall simplify and reformulate a few coincidence theorems on acyclic...
J. J. Gabszewicz (2006)
Banach Center Publications
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Grzegorz Gabor, Marc Quincampoix (2003)
Bollettino dell'Unione Matematica Italiana
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The present paper is devoted to sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria of Lipschitz multivalued maps in prescribed subsets of finite-dimensional spaces. The main improvement of the present study lies in the fact that we do not suppose any regular assumptions on the boundary of the subset. Our approach is based on behaviour of trajectories to the corresponding differential inclusion.
Sergeev, V. (2004)
Journal of Mathematical Sciences (New York)
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Plubtieng, Somyot, Sitthithakerngkiet, Kanokwan (2011)
Fixed Point Theory and Applications [electronic only]
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Stanisław Łojasiewicz, jr. (1985)
Banach Center Publications
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Jiří V. Outrata (2004)
Kybernetika
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The paper concerns a two-level hierarchical game, where the players on each level behave noncooperatively. In this way one can model eg an oligopolistic market with several large and several small firms. We derive two types of necessary conditions for a solution of this game and discuss briefly the possibilities of its computation.
Nguyen Van Khue (1985)
Colloquium Mathematicae
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