Displaying similar documents to “Bilateral sequential bargaining with perfect information and different protocols”

The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...

Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns

Rubén Becerril-Borja, Raúl Montes-de-Oca (2021)

Kybernetika

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The authors introduce risk sensitivity to a model of sequential games where players don't know beforehand which of them will make a choice at each stage of the game. It is shown that every sequential game without a predetermined order of turns with risk sensitivity has a Nash equilibrium, as well as in the case in which players have types that are chosen for them before the game starts and that are kept from the other players. There are also a couple of examples that show how the equilibria...

Risk-sensitive Markov stopping games with an absorbing state

Jaicer López-Rivero, Rolando Cavazos-Cadena, Hugo Cruz-Suárez (2022)

Kybernetika

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This work is concerned with discrete-time Markov stopping games with two players. At each decision time player II can stop the game paying a terminal reward to player I, or can let the system to continue its evolution. In this latter case player I applies an action affecting the transitions and entitling him to receive a running reward from player II. It is supposed that player I has a no-null and constant risk-sensitivity coefficient, and that player II tries to minimize the utility...

Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games

Sylvain Sorin, Cheng Wan (2013)

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle

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This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their...

Four different approaches to the normalized Banzhaf values of games with a priori unions

Honorata Sosnowska (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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Applying the Owen construction of value of games with a priori unions to the normalized Banzhaf value gives a new type of the normalized Banzhaf value for games with a priori unions. Using a simple example of a four-person voting game with a priori unions, it is shown that this value is different from those known in the literature: the normalized Owen-Banzhaf value, the Banzhaf share function defined by van der Laan and van den Brink and the Banzhaf index for simple games with a priori...