This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem....

The problem of designing realistic decentralized controller to solve a servomechanism problem in the framework of “large scale systems” is considered in this paper. As any large scale system is built by expanding construction of one subsystem being connected to the existing system. In particular, it is desired to find a local stabilizing controller in terms of a free parameter (belonging to the ring of proper stable transfer functions) so that desirable properties of the controlled system, such...

The paper deals with the synthesis of a non-fragile state controller with reduced design complexity for a class of continuous-time nonlinear delayed symmetric composite systems. Additive controller gain perturbations are considered. Both subsystems and interconnections include time-delays. A low-order control design system is first constructed. Then, stabilizing controllers with norm bounded gain uncertainties are designed for the control design system using linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) for...