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Constrained and indefinite games and their applications

CONTENTSIntroduction................................5   Preliminaries...........................6I. Games....................................9   1. Constrained games............9   2. Indefinite games...............13II. Applications.........................18   3. Model A: atomless............18   4. Model B: atomic................26Appendix..................................30References..............................40Subject index...........................42

Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces

Andrzej Wieczorek — 2005

Applicationes Mathematicae

The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence of equilibria...

Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets

Andrzej Wieczorek — 2004

Applicationes Mathematicae

Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity and constrained...

Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players

Sjur Didrik FlåmAndrzej Wieczorek — 2006

Banach Center Publications

The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.

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