Displaying similar documents to “Mindprints: the Structural Shadows of Mind-reality?”

Incommensurability and laboratory science

Emiliano Trizio (2004)

Philosophia Scientiae

Similarity:

The aim of the article is to establish relations between Kuhn’s general characterization of incommensurability as the impossibility to translate the taxonomies pertaining to rival scientific theories into one another and Hacking’s more specific version of incommensurability affecting competing theories that have stabilized relatively to different laboratory equipments and measurement techniques. On the basis of an analysis of the nature of scientific taxonomies that takes its inspiration...

Characterizing incommensurability on the basis of a contextual theory of language

Léna Soler (2004)

Philosophia Scientiae

Similarity:

In this article I present, first, a criticism of certain aspects of the way Martin Carrier characterizes semantic incommensurability on the basis of a contextual theory of language. Subsequently I introduce some distinctions and put forward some proposals in order to pursue the same project. It will be argued that two different conceptions of the notion “conditions of applications” and, correlatively, two different meanings of the clause “preservations of the inferential relations”,...

Reasons: belief support and goal dynamics.

Cristiano Castelfranchi (1996)

Mathware and Soft Computing

Similarity:

The paper is devoted to the structural relation between beliefs and goals. I discuss its importance in modelling cognitive agents; its origin in cognitive processing; its structure (belief structure relative to a goal); its crucial role in rationality, mediating between epistemic and pragmatic rationality; its role in goal Dynamics. I stress the crucial contribution of the supporting beliefs to the Processing of goals; to the Revision of goals (or Dynamics in a narrow sense), i.e. the...

Incommensurability and dynamic conceptual structures

Hanne Andersen (2004)

Philosophia Scientiae

Similarity:

One important problem concerning incommensurability is to explain how theories that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. In this paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue that his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does not suffice to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary developments. I shall show that his approach builds mainly on...