Displaying similar documents to “Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns”

Risk-sensitive Markov stopping games with an absorbing state

Jaicer López-Rivero, Rolando Cavazos-Cadena, Hugo Cruz-Suárez (2022)

Kybernetika

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This work is concerned with discrete-time Markov stopping games with two players. At each decision time player II can stop the game paying a terminal reward to player I, or can let the system to continue its evolution. In this latter case player I applies an action affecting the transitions and entitling him to receive a running reward from player II. It is supposed that player I has a no-null and constant risk-sensitivity coefficient, and that player II tries to minimize the utility...

The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...

Denumerable Markov stopping games with risk-sensitive total reward criterion

Manuel A. Torres-Gomar, Rolando Cavazos-Cadena, Hugo Cruz-Suárez (2024)

Kybernetika

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This paper studies Markov stopping games with two players on a denumerable state space. At each decision time player II has two actions: to stop the game paying a terminal reward to player I, or to let the system to continue it evolution. In this latter case, player I selects an action affecting the transitions and charges a running reward to player II. The performance of each pair of strategies is measured by the risk-sensitive total expected reward of player I. Under mild continuity...

Random priority two-person full-information best choice problem with imperfect observation

Zdzisław Porosiński, Krzysztof Szajowski (2000)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The following version of the two-player best choice problem is considered. Two players observe a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with a known continuous distribution. The random variables cannot be perfectly observed. Each time a random variable is sampled, the sampler is only informed whether it is greater than or less than some level specified by him. The aim of the players is to choose the best observation in the sequence (the maximal one). Each player can accept at most one realization...

Analysis and improvement attempt of prof. Alan Fowler's negotiation game

Jakub Jan Golik (2018)

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis | Studia ad Didacticam Mathematicae Pertinentia

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The main goal of the following article is to design an improved version of the negotiation game created by prof. Alan Fowler (Fowler, 1997). I have tried to achieve this by constructing four separate versions of the game which represent different approaches while preserving rules, chosen basic technical assumptions and the simplicity of the base game. Each version of the game is supposed to i.a. make it less obvious, create new negotiation possibilities (including potential cooperation),...

Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces

Andrzej Wieczorek (2005)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence...

An axiomatization of the aspiration core

Hans Keiding (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of...