Equilibrium analysis of distributed aggregative game with misinformation

Meng Yuan; Zhaoyang Cheng; Te Ma

Displaying similar documents to “Equilibrium analysis of distributed aggregative game with misinformation”

Linear complementarity problems and bi-linear games

Gokulraj Sengodan, Chandrashekaran Arumugasamy (2020)

Applications of Mathematics

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In this paper, we define bi-linear games as a generalization of the bimatrix games. In particular, we generalize concepts like the value and equilibrium of a bimatrix game to the general linear transformations defined on a finite dimensional space. For a special type of $𝐙$ -transformation we observe relationship between the values of the linear and bi-linear games. Using this relationship, we prove some known classical results in the theory of linear complementarity problems for this type...

Bayesian Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent incomplete-information aggregative games

Hanzheng Zhang, Huashu Qin, Guanpu Chen (2023)

Kybernetika

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In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of either Bayesian games or deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation function to adapt to incomplete-information situations. Since the feasible strategies are infinite-dimensional functions and lie in a non-compact set, the continuity of types brings barriers to seeking equilibria. To this end, we discretize...

Generalized Choquet spaces

Samuel Coskey, Philipp Schlicht (2016)

Fundamenta Mathematicae

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We introduce an analog to the notion of Polish space for spaces of weight ≤ κ, where κ is an uncountable regular cardinal such that $κ^{< κ} = κ$ . Specifically, we consider spaces in which player II has a winning strategy in a variant of the strong Choquet game which runs for κ many rounds. After discussing the basic theory of these games and spaces, we prove that there is a surjectively universal such space and that there are exactly $2^{κ}$ many such spaces up to homeomorphism. We also establish a Kuratowski-like...

Applications of limited information strategies in Menger's game

Steven Clontz (2017)

Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae

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As shown by Telgársky and Scheepers, winning strategies in the Menger game characterize $σ$ -compactness amongst metrizable spaces. This is improved by showing that winning Markov strategies in the Menger game characterize $σ$ -compactness amongst regular spaces, and that winning strategies may be improved to winning Markov strategies in second-countable spaces. An investigation of 2-Markov strategies introduces a new topological property between $σ$ -compact and Menger spaces.

Distributed accelerated Nash equilibrium learning for two-subnetwork zero-sum game with bilinear coupling

Xianlin Zeng, Lihua Dou, Jinqiang Cui (2023)

Kybernetika

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This paper proposes a distributed accelerated first-order continuous-time algorithm for $O (1 / t^{2})$ convergence to Nash equilibria in a class of two-subnetwork zero-sum games with bilinear couplings. First-order methods, which only use subgradients of functions, are frequently used in distributed/parallel algorithms for solving large-scale and big-data problems due to their simple structures. However, in the worst cases, first-order methods for two-subnetwork zero-sum games often have an asymptotic...

Topological games and product spaces

Salvador García-Ferreira, R. A. González-Silva, Artur Hideyuki Tomita (2002)

Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae

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In this paper, we deal with the product of spaces which are either $𝒢$ -spaces or $𝒢_{p}$ -spaces, for some $p \in ω^{*}$ . These spaces are defined in terms of a two-person infinite game over a topological space. All countably compact spaces are $𝒢$ -spaces, and every $𝒢_{p}$ -space is a $𝒢$ -space, for every $p \in ω^{*}$ . We prove that if ${X_{μ} : μ < ω_{1}}$ is a set of spaces whose product $X = \prod_{μ < ω_{1}} X_{μ}$ is a $𝒢$ -space, then there is $A \in {[ω_{1}]}^{\leq ω}$ such that $X_{μ}$ is countably compact for every $μ \in ω_{1} ∖ A$ . As a consequence, $X^{ω_{1}}$ is a $𝒢$ -space iff $X^{ω_{1}}$ is countably compact, and if $X^{2^{𝔠}}$ is a $𝒢$ -space,...

Applications of saddle-point determinants

Jan Hauke, Charles R. Johnson, Tadeusz Ostrowski (2015)

Discussiones Mathematicae - General Algebra and Applications

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For a given square matrix $A \in M_{n} (ℝ)$ and the vector $e \in {(ℝ)}^{n}$ of ones denote by (A,e) the matrix ⎡ A e ⎤ ⎣ $e^{T}$ 0 ⎦ This is often called the saddle point matrix and it plays a significant role in several branches of mathematics. Here we show some applications of it in: game theory and analysis. An application of specific saddle point matrices that are hollow, symmetric, and nonnegative is likewise shown in geometry as a generalization of Heron’s formula to give the volume of a general simplex, as well as...

Infinite games and chain conditions

Santi Spadaro (2016)

Fundamenta Mathematicae

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We apply the theory of infinite two-person games to two well-known problems in topology: Suslin’s Problem and Arhangel’skii’s problem on the weak Lindelöf number of the $G_{δ}$ topology on a compact space. More specifically, we prove results of which the following two are special cases: 1) every linearly ordered topological space satisfying the game-theoretic version of the countable chain condition is separable, and 2) in every compact space satisfying the game-theoretic version of the weak...

On β-favorability of the strong Choquet game

László Zsilinszky (2011)

Colloquium Mathematicae

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In the main result, partially answering a question of Telgársky, the following is proven: if X is a first countable R₀-space, then player β (i.e. the EMPTY player) has a winning strategy in the strong Choquet game on X if and only if X contains a nonempty $W_{δ}$ -subspace which is of the first category in itself.

On Telgársky's question concerning β-favorability of the strong Choquet game

László Zsilinszky (2013)

Colloquium Mathematicae

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Answering a question of Telgársky in the negative, it is shown that there is a space which is β-favorable in the strong Choquet game, but all of its nonempty $W_{δ}$ -subspaces are of the second category in themselves.

Uncountable γ-sets under axiom $C P A_{c u b e}^{g a m e}$

Krzysztof Ciesielski, Andrés Millán, Janusz Pawlikowski (2003)

Fundamenta Mathematicae

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We formulate a Covering Property Axiom $C P A_{c u b e}^{g a m e}$ , which holds in the iterated perfect set model, and show that it implies the existence of uncountable strong γ-sets in ℝ (which are strongly meager) as well as uncountable γ-sets in ℝ which are not strongly meager. These sets must be of cardinality ω₁ < , since every γ-set is universally null, while $C P A_{c u b e}^{g a m e}$ implies that every universally null has cardinality less than = ω₂. We also show that $C P A_{c u b e}^{g a m e}$ implies the existence of a partition of ℝ into ω₁ null...

On the Variational Inequality and Tykhonov Well-Posedness in Game Theory

C. A. Pensavalle, G. Pieri (2010)

Bollettino dell'Unione Matematica Italiana

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Consider a M-player game in strategic form $G=(X_{1},\cdots,X_{M},g_{1},\cdots,g_{M})$ where the set $X_{i}$ is a closed interval of real numbers and the payoff function $g_{i}$ is concave and differentiable with respect to the variable $x_{i}\in X_{i}$ , for any $i=1,\cdots,M$ . The aim of this paper is to find appropriate conditions on the payoff functions under the well-posedness with respect to the related variational inequality is equivalent to the formulation of the Tykhonov well-posedness in a game context. The idea of the proof is to appeal to a third equivalence,...

Nash -equilibria for stochastic games with total reward functions: an approach through Markov decision processes

Francisco J. González-Padilla, Raúl Montes-de-Oca (2019)

Kybernetika

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The main objective of this paper is to find structural conditions under which a stochastic game between two players with total reward functions has an $ϵ$ -equilibrium. To reach this goal, the results of Markov decision processes are used to find $ϵ$ -optimal strategies for each player and then the correspondence of a better answer as well as a more general version of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem to obtain the $ϵ$ -equilibrium mentioned. Moreover, two examples to illustrate the theory developed...

Some new versions of an old game

Vladimir Vladimirovich Tkachuk (1995)

Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae

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The old game is the point-open one discovered independently by F. Galvin [7] and R. Telgársky [17]. Recall that it is played on a topological space $X$ as follows: at the $n$ -th move the first player picks a point $x_{n} \in X$ and the second responds with choosing an open $U_{n} ∋ x_{n}$ . The game stops after $ω$ moves and the first player wins if $\cup {U_{n} : n \in ω} = X$ . Otherwise the victory is ascribed to the second player. In this paper we introduce and study the games $θ$ and $Ω$ . In $θ$ the moves are made exactly as in the point-open game,...