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Displaying 301 –
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We study the asymptotical behaviour of expected utility from terminal wealth on a market in which asset prices depend on economic factors that are unobserved or observed with delay.
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable.
In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations,
and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control
mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms
that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The
first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate
trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism is a generalization
of...
We propose new systems of axioms which characterize four types of values of cooperative games: the Banzhaf value, the Deegan-Packel value, the least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. The common element used in these axiomatizations is a fairness property. It requires that if to a cooperative game we add another game in which two given players are symmetric, then their payoffs change by the same amount. In our analysis we will use an idea applied by R. van den Brink (2001) to obtain...
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