We consider partial Browder-Tikhonov regularization techniques for variational inequality problems with P_0 cost mappings and box-constrained feasible sets. We present classes of economic equilibrium problems which satisfy such assumptions and propose a regularization method for these problems.
We consider a class of uniformly ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with the expected average payoff criterion, a separable metric state space and compact metric action spaces. We assume that the payoff and transition probability functions are uniformly continuous. Our aim is to prove the existence of stationary ε-equilibria for that class of ergodic stochastic games. This theorem extends to a much wider class of stochastic games a result proven recently by Bielecki [2].
We consider the problem of valuation of American (call and put) options written on a dividend paying stock governed by the geometric Brownian motion. We show that the value function has two different but related representations: by means of a solution of some nonlinear backward stochastic differential equation, and by a weak solution to some semilinear partial differential equation.
Bellman systems corresponding to stochastic differential games arising from a cost functional which models risk aspects are considered. Here it leads to diagonal elliptic systems without zero order term so that no simple -estimate is available.
We obtain a closed formula for the Laplace transform of the first moment of certain exponential functionals of Brownian motion with drift, which gives the price of Asian options. The proof relies on an identity in law between the average on [0,t] of a geometric Brownian motion and the value at time t of a Markov process, for which we can compute explicitly the resolvent.
The paper deals with Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) for copulas with nontrivial tail dependence. We show that both in the standard and the modified settings, the tail dependence function determines the limiting properties of CoVaR as the conditioning event becomes more extreme. The results are illustrated with examples using the extreme value, conic and truncation invariant families of bivariate tail-dependent copulas.
We study values for cooperative TU-games which are convex combinations of the Shapley value and the solidarity value, introduced in our recent paper [1]. First, we axiomatize the convex combination of the two values in the case when the coefficients are given exogenously. Next, we give an axiomatic description of the whole family of such values.
We present an alternative approach to decision-making in the framework of possibility theory, based on the idea of decision-making under uncertainty. We utilize the fact, that any possibility distribution can be viewed as an upper envelope of a set of probability distributions to which well-known minimax principle is applicable. Finally, we recall also an alternative to the minimax rule, so-called local minimax principle. Local minimax principle not only allows sequential construction of decision...