Displaying similar documents to “A game-theoretic model of social adaptation in an infinite population”

Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets

Andrzej Wieczorek (2004)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity...

Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players

J. Miękisz (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing symmetric games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.

Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

György Szabó (2008)

Banach Center Publications

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We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results...

Evolving small-board Go players using coevolutionary temporal difference learning with archives

Krzysztof Krawiec, Wojciech Jaśkowski, Marcin Szubert (2011)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We apply Coevolutionary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL) to learn small-board Go strategies represented as weighted piece counters. CTDL is a randomized learning technique which interweaves two search processes that operate in the intra-game and inter-game mode. Intra-game learning is driven by gradient-descent Temporal Difference Learning (TDL), a reinforcement learning method that updates the board evaluation function according to differences observed between its values for consecutively...

Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case...

Test, Teachers, Quorum (Pure Populations)

Radev, Slavian (2013)

Serdica Journal of Computing

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The “trial and error” method is fundamental for Master Minddecision algorithms. On the basis of Master Mind games and strategies weconsider some data mining methods for tests using students as teachers.Voting, twins, opposite, simulate and observer methods are investigated.For a pure data base these combinatorial algorithms are faster then manyAI and Master Mind methods. The complexities of these algorithms arecompared with basic combinatorial methods in AI. ACM Computing Classification...

Equilibria in a class of games and topological results implying their existence.

R.S. Simon, S. Spiez, H. Torunczyk (2008)

RACSAM

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We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.