In the present paper, a general multiobjective optimization problem is stated as a Nash game. In the nonrestrictive case of two objectives, we address the problem of the splitting of the design variable between the two players. The so-called territory splitting problem is solved by means of an allocative approach. We propose two algorithms in order to find fair allocation tables
We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results of spreading...
The upper bounds of the uniform distance between two sums of a random number of independent random variables are given. The application of these bounds is illustrated by stability (continuity) estimating in models in queueing and risk theory.
In economic systems, reactions to external shocks often come with a delay. On the other hand, agents try to anticipate future developments. Both can lead to difference-differential equations with an advancing argument. These are more difficult to handle than either difference or differential equations, but they have the merit of added realism and increased credibility. This paper generalizes a model from monetary economics by von Kalckreuth and Schröder. Working out its stability properties, we...
We develop a class of non-life reserving models using a stable-1/2 random bridge to simulate the accumulation of paid claims, allowing for an essentially arbitrary choice of a priori distribution for the ultimate loss. Taking an information-based approach to the reserving problem, we derive the process of the conditional distribution of the ultimate loss. The "best-estimate ultimate loss process" is given by the conditional expectation of the ultimate loss. We derive explicit expressions for the...
Axioms are given for positive comparative probabilities and plausibilities defined either on Boolean algebras or on arbitrary sets of events. These axioms allow to characterize binary relations representable by either standard or nonstandard measures (i. e. taking values either on the real field or on a hyperreal field). We also study relations between conditional events induced by preferences on conditional acts.
If Nonempty has a winning strategy against Empty in the Choquet game on a space, the space is said to be a Choquet space. Such a winning strategy allows Nonempty to consider the entire finite history of previous moves before making each new move; a stationary strategy only permits Nonempty to consider the previous move by Empty. We show that Nonempty has a stationary winning strategy for every second-countable T₁ Choquet space. More generally, Nonempty has a stationary winning strategy for...