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We consider the multiobjective decision making problem. The decision maker's (DM) impossibility to take consciously a preference or indifference attitude with regard to a pair of alternatives leads us to what we have called doubt attitude. So, the doubt may be revealed in a conscient way by the DM. However, it may appear in an inconscient way, revealing judgements about her/his attitudes which do not follow a certain logical reasoning.In this paper, doubt will be considered as a part of the information...
Let X be an arbitrary metric space and P be a porosity-like relation on X. We describe an infinite game which gives a characterization of σ-P-porous sets in X. This characterization can be applied to ordinary porosity above all but also to many other variants of porosity.
This paper
presents an application of Multiple Attribute Utility Theory on
strategic
choices concerning energy transportation. The environmental assessment
of a
network reinforcement strategy is emphasized. Our assessment brings
about to
consider multidimensional variables in MCDM. However, Multi-Attributed
Utility
Theory (MAUT) cannot, as a practical matter, manage such variables. We
therefore work out a methodology to transform multidimensional variables
into
unidimensional ones. We apply...
Les concepts d'éléments R-ressemblants à un prototype X et de R-regroupement d'objets introduits dans cet article, sont basés sur la notion de relation de S-comparaison R définie au moyen d'un indice scalaire de similarité défini entre sous-ensembles flous. Cette relation tient compte du fait que la similarité et la non-dissimilarité des sous-ensembles flous ne sont pas en général des synonymes. Une technique de coalescence floue basée sur des R-regroupements maximaux est également introduite.
The paper deals with the concept of coalitional preferences in the group decision-making situations in which the agents and coalitions have only vague idea about the comparative acceptability of particular outcomes. The coalitional games with vague utilities (see, e. g., [6]) can serve for a good example when some types of the game solutions (e. g., the von Neumann– Morgenstern one) are to be extended to the fuzzy game case. In this paper, we consider the fuzzy analogies of coalitional preferences...
A cooperative game is defined as a set of players and a cost function.
The distribution of the whole cost between the
players can be done using the core concept, that is the set of all
undominated cost allocations which prevent players
from grouping. In this paper we study a game whose cost function
comes from the optimal solution of a linear integer
covering problem. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for
the core to be nonempty and characterize its
allocations using linear programming...
For k ≥ 2 we define a class of graphs 𝓗 ₖ = {G: every block of G has at most k vertices}. The class 𝓗 ₖ contains among other graphs forests, Husimi trees, line graphs of forests, cactus graphs. We consider the colouring game and the generalized colouring game on graphs from 𝓗 ₖ.
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