Ein elementarer Zugang zur Leray-Schauder-Theorie
This paper is concerned with existence of equilibrium of a set-valued map in a given compact subset of a finite-dimensional space. Previously known conditions ensuring existence of equilibrium imply that the set is either invariant or viable for the differential inclusion generated by the set-valued map. We obtain some equilibrium existence results with conditions which imply neither invariance nor viability of the given set. The problem of existence of strict equilibria is also discussed.
We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.