A few remarks on vector optimization from the coalition-game theoretical point-of-view
The paper deals with the concept of coalitional preferences in the group decision-making situations in which the agents and coalitions have only vague idea about the comparative acceptability of particular outcomes. The coalitional games with vague utilities (see, e. g., [6]) can serve for a good example when some types of the game solutions (e. g., the von Neumann– Morgenstern one) are to be extended to the fuzzy game case. In this paper, we consider the fuzzy analogies of coalitional preferences...
This paper deals with two ways in which uncertainty notions enter social science models: 1) They can be used in an effort to make intelligible some phenomena that would otherwise be difficult to comprehend, or 2) They can be use to generalize or modify the domain of validity of some theoretical results.
The aggregation of preference relations in group decision-making (GDM) problems can be carried out based on either the reliability of the preference values to be aggregated, as is the case with ordered weighted averaging operators, or on the reliability of the source of information that provided the preferences, as is the case with weighted mean operators. In this paper, we address the problem of aggregation based on the reliability of the source of information, with a double aim: a) To provide...
En la Teoría de la Decisión en Grupo, cuando los expertos emiten su información sobre los objetos de una manera probabilística, se pueden construir Principios de Consistencia que satisfagan los cinco principios de racionalidad y no sean dictatoriales [ver Sánchez-Pérez-Domench (1986)].Partiendo de esta situación, en el presente artículo se analizan y proponen diferentes métodos y algoritmos para transformar relaciones sociales aleatorias en determinísticas, continuando y completando así investigaciones...