Los costes fijos y variables de un elemento productivo dependen de la política de renovación del elemento y de la intensidad de utilización del mismo. En el artículo se estudia esta dependencia y se establecen expresiones para el cálculo del coste fijo y de una parte del coste variable.
We investigate some natural questions about the class of posets which can be embedded into ⟨ω,≤*⟩. Our main tool is a simple ccc forcing notion which generically embeds a given poset E into ⟨ω,≤*⟩ and does this in a “minimal” way (see Theorems 9.1, 10.1, 6.1 and 9.2).
This work deals with a class of discrete-time zero-sum Markov games whose state process evolves according to the equation where and represent the actions of player 1 and 2, respectively, and is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with unknown distribution . Assuming possibly unbounded payoff, and using the empirical distribution to estimate , we introduce approximation schemes for the value of the game as well as for optimal strategies considering both,...
In many markets, especially in energy markets, electricity markets for instance, the detention of the physical asset is quite difficult. This is also the case for crude oil as treated by Davis (2000). So one can identify a good proxy which is an asset (financial or physical) (one)whose the spot price is significantly correlated with the spot price of the underlying (e.g. electicity or crude oil). Generally, the market could become incomplete. We explicit exact hedging strategies for exponential...
We employ a natural method from the perspective of the optimal stopping theory to analyze entry-exit decisions with implementation delay of a project, and provide closed expressions for optimal entry decision times, optimal exit decision times, and the maximal expected present value of the project. The results in conventional research were obtained under the restriction that the sum of the entry cost and exit cost is nonnegative. In practice, we may meet cases when this sum is negative, so it is...
MSC 2010: 26A33, 33E12, 33C60, 44A20The classical economic production model (EPQ) has been extended in many directions to incorporate factors encountered in real-life situations. In this paper, an EPQ model that accounts for the cost of raw material needed for production is examined. It is assumed that the raw material acquired from the supplier contains a percentage of imperfect quality items. At the beginning of the inventory cycle, the raw material is received instantaneously, and a 100% screening...
We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.
We study a generalization of bimatrix games in which not all pairs of players' pure strategies are admissible. It is shown that under some additional convexity assumptions such games have equilibria of a very simple structure, consisting of two probability distributions with at most two-element supports. Next this result is used to get a theorem about the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with a possibility of payoffs equal to -∞. The first of these results is a discrete counterpart...
This article studies an equilibrium search problem when jobs provided by firms can be either unskilled or skilled and when workers differing in their education level can be either low-educated or high-educated. The structure proportion of jobs affects the equilibrium which indicates a threshold that can distinguish whether the equilibrium is separating or cross-skill. In addition, the cross-skill equilibrium solution implies the high-educated workers are more likely to obtain higher pay rates than...
We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing symmetric games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.