Duality for the level sum of quasiconvex functions and applications
We study a quasiconvex conjugation that transforms the level sum of functions into the pointwise sum of their conjugates and derive new duality results for the minimization of the max of two quasiconvex functions. Following Barron and al., we show that the level sum provides quasiconvex viscosity solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi equations in which the initial condition is a general continuous quasiconvex function which is not necessarily Lipschitz or bounded.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90C48, 49N15, 90C25In this paper we reconsider a nonconvex duality theory established by B. Lemaire and M. Volle (see [4]), related to a primal problem of minimizing the difference of two convex functions subject to a DC-constraint. The purpose of this note is to present a new method based on Toland-Singer duality principle. Applications to the case when the constraints are vector-valued are provided.
Duality of linear programming is used to establish an important duality theorem for a class of non-linear programming problems. Primal problem has quasimonotonic objective function and a convex polyhedron as its constraint set.
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that the value functions of this game satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle...
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...
The paper considers a methodology of mathematical modeling of ecological-economic processes at the regional level. The basis of the model is formed by equations, which describe two interacting blocks: economic and ecological ones. Equations of the economic block are represented by relations of generalized inter-branch balance, while the ecological part is described in terms of differential equations with deviations with respect to some given state of natural resources. Issues of i) information...