Simulation models for collective decision making are based on theoretical and empirical insight in the decision making process, but still contain a number of parameters of which the values are determined ad hoc. For the dynamic access model, some of such parameters are discussed, and it is proposed to extend the utility functions with a random term of which the variance also is an unknown parameter. These parameters can be estimated by fitting model predictions to data, where the predictions can...

Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.

Le but de cet article est de procéder à une présentation pédagogique d'un concept étendu de rationalité, la rationalité stochastique. Dans une première partie, nous exposons le problème à l'aide d'un exemple simple et posons un ensemble de définitions préliminaires. Puis, dans une seconde partie, nous présentons le résultat fondamental de Falmagne (1978) s'appliquant aux situations de choix multiples ; l'approche ensembliste de cet auteur est formalisée à partir du concept de polynômes de Block-Marschak...

This paper studies a bi-parametric family of decision rules, so-called restricted distinguished chairman rules, which contains several one-parameter classes of rules considered previously in the literature. Roughly speaking, these rules apply to a variety of situations where the original committee appoints a subcommittee. Moreover, the chairman of the subcommittee, who is supposed to be the most competent committee member, may have more voting power than other jurors. Under the assumption of exponentially...