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This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem....
King and Korf [KingKorf01] introduced, in the framework of a discrete- time dynamic market model on a general probability space, a new concept of arbitrage called free lunch in the limit which is slightly weaker than the common free lunch. The definition was motivated by the attempt at proposing the pricing theory based on the theory of conjugate duality in optimization. We show that this concept of arbitrage fails to have a basic property of other common concepts used in pricing theory – it depends...
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