Oligopoly equilibrium in pure exchange economies
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover,...
Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market leads to coupled systems of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints, called equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We consider a simplified model for competition in electricity markets under uncertainty of demand in an electricity network as a (stochastic) multi-leader-follower game. First order necessary conditions are developed for the corresponding stochastic EPEC based on a result...
Option pricing in the multidimensional case, i.e. when the contingent claim paid at maturity depends on a number of risky assets, is considered. It is assumed that the prices of the risky assets are in discrete time subject to binomial disturbances. Two approaches to option pricing are studied: geometric and analytic. A numerical example is also given.