Dual finite element analysis for some unilateral boundary value problems
A model second order elliptic equation in cylindrical coordinates with mixed boundary conditions is considered. A dual variational formulation is employed to calculate the cogradient of the solution directly. Approximations are defined on the basis of standard finite elements spaces. Convergence analysis and some a posteriori error estimates are presented.
The paper presents a problem of duality for the obstacle and unilateral biharmonic problem (the equilibrium of a thin plate with an obstacle inside the domain or on the boundary). The dual variational inequality is derived by introducing polar functions.
A mixed finite element method for the Navier–Stokes equations is introduced in which the stress is a primary variable. The variational formulation retains the mathematical structure of the Navier–Stokes equations and the classical theory extends naturally to this setting. Finite element spaces satisfying the associated inf–sup conditions are developed.
Dubrovin type equations for the N -gap solution of a completely integrable system associated with a polynomial pencil is constructed and then integrated to a system of functional equations. The approach used to derive those results is a generalization of the familiar process of finding the 1-soliton (1-gap) solution by integrating the ODE obtained from the soliton equation via the substitution u = u(x + λt).
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that the value functions of this game satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle...
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...