A game theoretical analysis of the quantity discount problem with perfect and incomplete information about the buyer's cost structure
A Game Theoretical Approach to The Algebraic Counterpart of The Wagner Hierarchy : Part II
The algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy consists of a well-founded and decidable classification of finite pointed ω-semigroups of width 2 and height ωω. This paper completes the description of this algebraic hierarchy. We first give a purely algebraic decidability procedure of this partial ordering by introducing a graph representation of finite pointed ω-semigroups allowing to compute their precise Wagner degrees. The Wagner degree of any ω-rational language can therefore be computed...
A game theoretical approach to the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy : Part I
The algebraic study of formal languages shows that ω-rational sets correspond precisely to the ω-languages recognizable by finite ω-semigroups. Within this framework, we provide a construction of the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy. We adopt a hierarchical game approach, by translating the Wadge theory from the ω-rational language to the ω-semigroup context. More precisely, we first show that the Wagner degree is indeed a syntactic invariant. We then define a reduction relation on...
A note on a class of equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints
The paper concerns a two-level hierarchical game, where the players on each level behave noncooperatively. In this way one can model eg an oligopolistic market with several large and several small firms. We derive two types of necessary conditions for a solution of this game and discuss briefly the possibilities of its computation.
Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems
A well-known result in public economics is that capital income should not be taxed in the long run. This result has been derived using necessary optimality conditions for an appropriate dynamic Stackelberg game. In this paper we consider three models of dynamic taxation in continuous time and suggest a method for calculating their feedback Nash equilibria based on a sufficient condition for optimality. We show that the optimal tax on capital income is generally different from zero.
New convergence results for Nash equilibria.
Optimality conditions for a class of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints: strongly regular case
The paper deals with mathematical programs, where parameter-dependent nonlinear complementarity problems arise as side constraints. Using the generalized differential calculus for nonsmooth and set-valued mappings due to B. Mordukhovich, we compute the so-called coderivative of the map assigning the parameter the (set of) solutions to the respective complementarity problem. This enables, in particular, to derive useful 1st-order necessary optimality conditions, provided the complementarity problem...
Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems
This paper is concerned with a security problem for a discrete-time linear networked control system of switched dynamics. The control sequence generated by a remotely located controller is transmitted over a vulnerable communication network, where the control input may be corrupted by false data injection attacks launched by a malicious adversary. Two partially conflicted cost functions are constructed as the quantitative guidelines for both the controller and the attacker, after which a switched...