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Deterministic Markov Nash equilibria for potential discrete-time stochastic games

Alejandra Fonseca-Morales (2022)

Kybernetika

In this paper, we study the problem of finding deterministic (also known as feedback or closed-loop) Markov Nash equilibria for a class of discrete-time stochastic games. In order to establish our results, we develop a potential game approach based on the dynamic programming technique. The identified potential stochastic games have Borel state and action spaces and possibly unbounded nondifferentiable cost-per-stage functions. In particular, the team (or coordination) stochastic games and the stochastic...

Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise

Juan J. Manfredi, Mikko Parviainen, Julio D. Rossi (2012)

ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations

We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...

Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise

Juan J. Manfredi, Mikko Parviainen, Julio D. Rossi (2012)

ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations

We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that the value functions of this game satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle...

Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns

Rubén Becerril-Borja, Raúl Montes-de-Oca (2021)

Kybernetika

The authors introduce risk sensitivity to a model of sequential games where players don't know beforehand which of them will make a choice at each stage of the game. It is shown that every sequential game without a predetermined order of turns with risk sensitivity has a Nash equilibrium, as well as in the case in which players have types that are chosen for them before the game starts and that are kept from the other players. There are also a couple of examples that show how the equilibria might...

Linear-quadratic differential games: from finite to infinite dimension

Michel C. Delfour (2008)

Applicationes Mathematicae

The object of this paper is the generalization of the pioneering work of P. Bernhard [J. Optim. Theory Appl. 27 (1979)] on two-person zero-sum games with a quadratic utility function and linear dynamics. It relaxes the semidefinite positivity assumption on the matrices in front of the state in the utility function and introduces affine feedback strategies that are not necessarily L²-integrable in time. It provides a broad conceptual review of recent results in the finite-dimensional case for which...

Stochastic differential games involving impulse controls

Feng Zhang (2011)

ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations

A zero-sum stochastic differential game problem on infinite horizon with continuous and impulse controls is studied. We obtain the existence of the value of the game and characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated system of quasi-variational inequalities. We also obtain a verification theorem which provides an optimal strategy of the game.

Stochastic differential games involving impulse controls*

Feng Zhang (2011)

ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations

A zero-sum stochastic differential game problem on infinite horizon with continuous and impulse controls is studied. We obtain the existence of the value of the game and characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated system of quasi-variational inequalities. We also obtain a verification theorem which provides an optimal strategy of the game.

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