Decision theory: von Neumann's contributions.
Degrees of indeterminacy of games
Discrete and nondiscrete duels
Domination Game: Extremal Families for the 3/5-Conjecture for Forests
In the domination game on a graph G, the players Dominator and Staller alternately select vertices of G. Each vertex chosen must strictly increase the number of vertices dominated. This process eventually produces a dominating set of G; Dominator aims to minimize the size of this set, while Staller aims to maximize it. The size of the dominating set produced under optimal play is the game domination number of G, denoted by γg(G). Kinnersley, West and Zamani [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 27 (2013) 2090-2107]...
Duels with possibly asymmetric goals
Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...
Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that the value functions of this game satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle...
Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...