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We consider a model for the control of a linear network flow system with unknown but bounded demand
and polytopic bounds on controlled flows. We are interested in the problem of finding a suitable objective function
that makes robust optimal the policy represented by the so-called linear saturated feedback control.
We regard the problem as a suitable differential game with switching cost and study it in the framework of the viscosity solutions theory for Bellman and Isaacs equations.
We consider a model for the control of a linear network flow system with unknown but bounded demand
and polytopic bounds on controlled flows. We are interested in the problem of finding a suitable objective function
that makes robust optimal the policy represented by the so-called linear saturated feedback control.
We regard the problem as a suitable differential game with switching cost and study it in the framework of the viscosity solutions theory for Bellman and Isaacs equations.
Noncooperative games with systems governed by nonlinear differential equations remain, in general, nonconvex even if continuously extended (i. e. relaxed) in terms of Young measures. However, if the individual payoff functionals are “enough” uniformly convex and the controlled system is only “slightly” nonlinear, then the relaxed game enjoys a globally convex structure, which guarantees existence of its Nash equilibria as well as existence of approximate Nash equilibria (in a suitable sense) for...
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