Sobre la existencia de soluciones no dominadas.
Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solutions
In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining outcomes. Two new axioms regarding compensation for low skill agents are introduced as...
Soluciones de los juegos N-personales.
Solutions of transferable utility cooperative games
Some values for constant-sum and bilateral cooperative games
We prove new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition as well as on nonnegative bilateral games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition. A characteristic feature of the latter class of cooperative games is that for such a game any coalition and its complement in the set of all players have the same worth. The axiomatizations are then generalized to the entire class of constant-sum...
Stability of coalition structures and imputations in coalition-games
Sufficient conditions for the solution existence in general coalition games
Suggestion of a cooperative market model
Superadditivity in general fuzzy coalition games
The superadditivity and related concepts belong to the fundamental ones in the coalition game theory. Their definition in general coalition games (games without side-payments) is based on the set theoretical approaches. It means that in the case of fuzzy coalition games the set theoretical model can be modified into the fuzzy set theoretical one. In this paper, the coalition games without side-payments and with fuzzy expectations of the pay-offs of players are considered and it is shown that for...
Tarification par des jeux coopératifs avec demandes élastiques
Nous proposons ici un modèle de Tarification basé sur une extension du formalisme des Jeux Coopératifs et qui prend en compte la notion d’Élasticité de la Demande. Nous présentons pour ce modèle un résultat d’existence ainsi qu’un algorithme de calcul associé. Nous interprétons enfin ce nouveau concept dans le cas d’un problème de production et nous le prolongeons au cas d’un problème de transport.
Tarification par des jeux Coopératifs avec Demandes Élastiques
We propose here a pricing Model which is an extension of the Cooperative Game concept and which includes a notion of Elastic Demand. We present some existence results as well as some algorithms. We conclude by discussing this model in the context of some Production and Transportation problems.
The convergence of the core of a fuzzy exchange economy
This paper focuses on a new model called fuzzy exchange economy (FXE), which integrates fuzzy consumption, fuzzy initial endowment and the agent’s fuzzy preference (vague attitude) in the fuzzy consumption set. Also, the existence of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium for the FXE is verified through a related pure exchange economy. We define a core-like concept (called weak fuzzy core) of the FXE and prove that any fuzzy competitive allocation belongs to the weak fuzzy core. The fuzzy replica economy,...
The equal split-off set for cooperative games
In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.
The even-odd hat problem
We answer a question of C. Hardin and A. Taylor concerning a hat-guessing game.
The sigma-core of a cooperative game.
Three additive solutions of cooperative games with a priori unions
We analyze axiomatic properties of three types of additive solutions of cooperative games with a priori unions structure. One of these is the Banzhaf value with a priori unions introduced by G. Owen (1981), which has not been axiomatically characterized as yet. Generalizing Owen's approach and the constructions discussed by J. Deegan and E. W. Packel (1979) and L. M. Ruiz, F. Valenciano and J. M. Zarzuelo (1996) we define and study two other solutions. These are the Deegan-Packel value with a priori...
Top responsiveness and Nash stability in coalition formation games
Top responsiveness was shown by Alcalde and Revilla [AR] to guarantee the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation games. In this paper we prove the existence of Nash stable partitions under top responsiveness when a mutuality condition is imposed.
Two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions
Una nota acerca de los puntos E-estables perfectos y propios.
Values of majority voting games with distrust operators
A distrust operator, describing a kind of agreement among a group of players, transforms any characteristic function game to another game. In this new game, a player from this group can legally access a coalition if and only if all players from the group do the same. A formula for the Shapley value of games obtained by applying distrust operators to one man-one vote majority voting games is given, and the cases in which such an "agreement" is profitable to its parties are discussed. We also prove...