All a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z Other

Previous Page 2 Next

Displaying 21 – 40 of 143

Showing per page

A repeated imitation model with dependence between stages: Decision strategies and rewards

Pablo J. Villacorta, David A. Pelta (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

Adversarial decision making is aimed at determining strategies to anticipate the behavior of an opponent trying to learn from our actions. One defense is to make decisions intended to confuse the opponent, although our rewards can be diminished. This idea has already been captured in an adversarial model introduced in a previous work, in which two agents separately issue responses to an unknown sequence of external inputs. Each agent's reward depends on the current input and the responses of both...

Approximations of dynamic Nash games with general state and action spaces and ergodic costs for the players

Tomasz Bielecki (1997)

Applicationes Mathematicae

The purpose of this paper is to prove existence of an ε -equilib- rium point in a dynamic Nash game with Borel state space and long-run time average cost criteria for the players. The idea of the proof is first to convert the initial game with ergodic costs to an ``equivalent" game endowed with discounted costs for some appropriately chosen value of the discount factor, and then to approximate the discounted Nash game obtained in the first step with a countable state space game for which existence...

Bad(s,t) is hyperplane absolute winning

Erez Nesharim, David Simmons (2014)

Acta Arithmetica

J. An proved that for any s,t ≥ 0 such that s + t = 1, Bad (s,t) is (34√2)¯¹-winning for Schmidt's game. We show that using the main lemma from [An] one can derive a stronger result, namely that Bad (s,t) is hyperplane absolute winning in the sense of [BFKRW]. As a consequence, one can deduce the full Hausdorff dimension of Bad (s,t) intersected with certain fractals.

Bilateral sequential bargaining with perfect information and different protocols

Robert Golański (2006)

Banach Center Publications

Most research done in the bargaining literature concentrates on the situations in which players get to be proposers alternately, with the first player being the proposer in the first period, the second player being the proposer in the second period, and so on until the cycle ends and the order of proposers is repeated. However, allowing for only this kind of order is a rather simplifying assumption. This paper looks at the situation in which we allow for much more general kind of protocols. We characterize...

Bi-personal stochastic transient Markov games with stopping times and total reward criterion

Martínez-Cortés Victor Manuel (2021)

Kybernetika

The article is devoted to a class of Bi-personal (players 1 and 2), zero-sum Markov games evolving in discrete-time on Transient Markov reward chains. At each decision time the second player can stop the system by paying terminal reward to the first player. If the system is not stopped the first player selects a decision and two things will happen: The Markov chain reaches next state according to the known transition law, and the second player must pay a reward to the first player. The first player...

Combinatorics of Dyadic Intervals: Consistent Colourings

Anna Kamont, Paul F. X. Müller (2014)

Bulletin of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Mathematics

We study the problem of consistent and homogeneous colourings for increasing families of dyadic intervals. We determine when this problem can be solved and when it cannot.

Domination Game: Extremal Families for the 3/5-Conjecture for Forests

Michael A. Henning, Christian Löwenstein (2017)

Discussiones Mathematicae Graph Theory

In the domination game on a graph G, the players Dominator and Staller alternately select vertices of G. Each vertex chosen must strictly increase the number of vertices dominated. This process eventually produces a dominating set of G; Dominator aims to minimize the size of this set, while Staller aims to maximize it. The size of the dominating set produced under optimal play is the game domination number of G, denoted by γg(G). Kinnersley, West and Zamani [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 27 (2013) 2090-2107]...

Currently displaying 21 – 40 of 143