General exchange economy
The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence of equilibria...
In this paper, we develop a supply chain network equilibrium model in which electronic commerce in the presence of both B2B (business-to-business) and B2C (business-to-consumer) transactions, multiperiod decision-making and multicriteria decision-making are integrated. The model consists of three tiers of decision-makers (manufacturers, retailers and consumers at demand markets) who compete within a tier but may cooperate between tiers. Both manufacturers and retailers are concerned with maximization...
In this paper, we develop a supply chain network equilibrium model in which electronic commerce in the presence of both B2B (business-to-business) and B2C (business-to-consumer) transactions, multiperiod decision-making and multicriteria decision-making are integrated. The model consists of three tiers of decision-makers (manufacturers, retailers and consumers at demand markets) who compete within a tier but may cooperate between tiers. Both manufacturers and retailers are concerned with maximization...
We show that a recent existence result for the Nash equilibria of generalized games with strategy sets in -spaces is false. We prove that it becomes true if we assume, in addition, that the feasible set of the game (the set of all feasible multistrategies) is closed.
We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the initial chance move according to a probability distribution p over the two-dimensional integer lattice that is known to both players. Player 1 is informed on the prices of both types of shares, but Player 2 is not. The bids may take any integer values....
A class of multi-objective fuzzy matrix games is studied and it is shown that solving such a game is equivalent to solving a pair of multi-objective linear programming problems. This work generalizes an earlier study of Fernandez et al. [7] from crisp scenario to fuzzy scenario on the lines of Bector et al. [4]. Further certain difficulties with similar studies reported in the literature are also discussed.
We describe a sequent calculus μLJ with primitives for inductive and coinductive datatypes and equip it with reduction rules allowing a sound translation of Gödel’s system T. We introduce the notion of a μ-closed category, relying on a uniform interpretation of open μLJ formulas as strong functors. We show that any μ-closed category is a sound model for μLJ. We then turn to the construction of a concrete μ-closed category based on Hyland-Ong game semantics. The model relies on three main ingredients:...