Competitive inventory models
Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities à la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
Control of a team of mobile robots based on non-cooperative equilibria with partial coordination
In this work we present an application of the concept of non-cooperative game equilibria to the design of a collision free movement of a team of mobile robots in a dynamic environment. We propose the solution to the problem of feasible control synthesis, based on a partially centralized sensory system. The control strategy based on the concept of non-cooperative game equilibria is well known in the literature. It is highly efficient through phases where the solution is unique. However, even in simple...
Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential games. The advantage of this approach is that every ergodic system (repeated game) can be represented by a Lyapunov-like function. A direct acyclic graph is associated with a game. The graph structure represents the dependencies existing between the strategy profiles. By definition, a Lyapunov-like function monotonically decreases and converges to a single Lyapunov equilibrium point identified by...
Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players
The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.