Nous proposons ici un modèle de Tarification basé sur une extension du formalisme des Jeux Coopératifs et qui prend en compte la notion d’Élasticité de la Demande. Nous présentons pour ce modèle un résultat d’existence ainsi qu’un algorithme de calcul associé. Nous interprétons enfin ce nouveau concept dans le cas d’un problème de production et nous le prolongeons au cas d’un problème de transport.
We propose here a pricing Model which is an extension of the Cooperative Game concept and which includes a notion of Elastic Demand. We present some existence results as well as some algorithms. We conclude by discussing this model in the context of some Production and Transportation problems.
This paper focuses on a new model called fuzzy exchange economy (FXE), which integrates fuzzy consumption, fuzzy initial endowment and the agent’s fuzzy preference (vague attitude) in the fuzzy consumption set. Also, the existence of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium for the FXE is verified through a related pure exchange economy. We define a core-like concept (called weak fuzzy core) of the FXE and prove that any fuzzy competitive allocation belongs to the weak fuzzy core. The fuzzy replica economy,...
In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.
We answer a question of C. Hardin and A. Taylor concerning a hat-guessing game.
We analyze axiomatic properties of three types of additive solutions of cooperative games with a priori unions structure. One of these is the Banzhaf value with a priori unions introduced by G. Owen (1981), which has not been axiomatically characterized as yet. Generalizing Owen's approach and the constructions discussed by J. Deegan and E. W. Packel (1979) and L. M. Ruiz, F. Valenciano and J. M. Zarzuelo (1996) we define and study two other solutions. These are the Deegan-Packel value with a priori...
Top responsiveness was shown by Alcalde and Revilla [AR] to guarantee the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation games. In this paper we prove the existence of Nash stable partitions under top responsiveness when a mutuality condition is imposed.