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Coalitional fuzzy preferences

Milan Mareš (2002)

Kybernetika

The paper deals with the concept of coalitional preferences in the group decision-making situations in which the agents and coalitions have only vague idea about the comparative acceptability of particular outcomes. The coalitional games with vague utilities (see, e. g., [6]) can serve for a good example when some types of the game solutions (e. g., the von Neumann– Morgenstern one) are to be extended to the fuzzy game case. In this paper, we consider the fuzzy analogies of coalitional preferences...

Coeur et nucléolus des jeux de recouvrement

Nicolas Preux, Fatiha Bendali, Jean Mailfert, Alain Quilliot (2010)

RAIRO - Operations Research

A cooperative game is defined as a set of players and a cost function. The distribution of the whole cost between the players can be done using the core concept, that is the set of all undominated cost allocations which prevent players from grouping. In this paper we study a game whose cost function comes from the optimal solution of a linear integer covering problem. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the core to be nonempty and characterize its allocations using linear programming...

Convex interval games.

Gök, S.Z.Alparslan, Branzei, R., Tijs, S. (2009)

Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences

Convexity of production, common pool and oligopoly games: a survey

Theo S. H. Driessen, Holger Meinhardt (2006)

Banach Center Publications

The paper surveys a uniform proof technique of the convexity property for three different cooperative TU games arising from three different economical settings. The production economy, common pool situation and oligopoly framework involve a cost function, but different production functions. Each of the three corresponding game theoretic models refers to some maximization problem described by optimizing a certain net profit function over all feasible production levels. The current mathematical proof...

Cooperación y defensa.

Francesc Carreras (1993)

Qüestiió

Se aplican conceptos y técnicas de la teoría de juegos cooperativos a problemas de decisión que afectan a la política de Defensa del país. El análisis permite evaluar las propuestas sobre procedimientos de votación cualificada presentadas al Consejo Europeo en la cumbre de Maastricht de diciembre de 1991. Se ponen así de manifiesto las implicaciones que supondría para la posición estratégica de España la inédita capacidad operativa concedida a la Comunidad por el tratado de unión política.

Cooperative fuzzy games extended from ordinary cooperative games with restrictions on coalitions

Atsushi Moritani, Tetsuzo Tanino, Keiji Tatsumi (2006)

Kybernetika

Cooperative games are very useful in considering profit allocation among multiple decision makers who cooperate with each other. In order to deal with cooperative games in practical situations, however, we have to deal with two additional factors. One is some restrictions on coalitions. This first factor has been taken into consideration through feasibility of coalitions. The other is partial cooperation of players. In order to describe this second factor, we consider fuzzy coalitions which permit...

Cooperative networks games with elastic demands

Alain Quilliot, Fatiha Bendali, Jean Mailfert (2007)

RAIRO - Operations Research

We present here a pricing model which is an extension of the cooperative game concept and which includes a notion of elastic demand. We present some existence results as well as an algorithm, and we conclude by discussing a specific problem related to network pricing.

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