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Combat Management System training uses simulation of an overall tactical situation. This involves the real-time management of numerous and diverse entities to keep the simulation scenario consistent in a highly dynamic environment. To address this difficult problem, we propose an adaptive multi-agent system in which each entity is considered as a smart sensor/effector mobile. The autonomy and the dynamic behaviour offered to each entity leads the simulation to self-adapt to inevitable disturbances...
Two games are inseparable by semivalues if both games
obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of
separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null
game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games
inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games
different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the
consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows
us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector
subspace...
We propose a generalization of simple coalition games in the context of games with fuzzy coalitions. Mimicking the correspondence of simple games with non-constant monotone formulas of classical logic, we introduce simple Łukasiewicz games using monotone formulas of Łukasiewicz logic, one of the most prominent fuzzy logics. We study the core solution on the class of simple Łukasiewicz games and show that cores of such games are determined by finitely-many linear constraints only. The non-emptiness...
In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining outcomes. Two new axioms regarding compensation for low skill agents are introduced as...
We prove new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition as well as on nonnegative bilateral games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition. A characteristic feature of the latter class of cooperative games is that for such a game any coalition and its complement in the set of all players have the same worth. The axiomatizations are then generalized to the entire class of constant-sum...
The superadditivity and related concepts belong to the fundamental ones in the coalition game theory. Their definition in general coalition games (games without side-payments) is based on the set theoretical approaches. It means that in the case of fuzzy coalition games the set theoretical model can be modified into the fuzzy set theoretical one. In this paper, the coalition games without side-payments and with fuzzy expectations of the pay-offs of players are considered and it is shown that for...
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