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Nonzero-sum semi-Markov games with countable state spaces

Wojciech Połowczuk (2000)

Applicationes Mathematicae

We consider nonzero-sum semi-Markov games with a countable state space and compact metric action spaces. We assume that the payoff, mean holding time and transition probability functions are continuous on the action spaces. The main results concern the existence of Nash equilibria for nonzero-sum discounted semi-Markov games and a class of ergodic semi-Markov games with the expected average payoff criterion.

On a new solution concept for bargaining problems

Tadeusz Radzik (1998)

Applicationes Mathematicae

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover,...

On the best choice of a damping sequence in iterative optimization methods.

Leonid N. Vaserstein (1988)

Publicacions Matemàtiques

Some iterative methods of mathematical programming use a damping sequence {αt} such that 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 for all t, αt → 0 as t → ∞, and Σ αt = ∞. For example, αt = 1/(t+1) in Brown's method for solving matrix games. In this paper, for a model class of iterative methods, the convergence rate for any damping sequence {αt} depending only on time t is computed. The computation is used to find the best damping sequence.

On two-point Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with convexity properties

Wojciech Połowczuk (2006)

Applicationes Mathematicae

This paper considers bimatrix games with matrices having concavity properties. The games described by such payoff matrices well approximate two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square, with payoff functions F₁(x,y) concave in x for each y, and/or F₂(x,y) concave in y for each x. For these games it is shown that there are Nash equilibria in players' strategies with supports consisting of at most two points. Also a simple search procedure for such Nash equilibria is given.

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