General coalition-games
General exchange economy
Generalizations of the Nash equilibrium theorem in the KKM theory.
Generalized cooperative games and markets
Joint investment strategies with a superadditive capitalization function
Juegos con corazón no vacío. Una nueva caracterización.
Se introducen las definiciones usuales sobre teoría de juegos cooperativos, dándose la caracterización de Bondareva-Shapley para juegos con corazón no vacío. Se obtiene una caracterización para esta última clase de juegos, partiendo del concepto de función supermodular.
L'importance des réseaux en économie
Multiobjective problems of convex geometry.
Nash equilibria for a model of traffic flow with several groups of drivers
Traffic flow is modeled by a conservation law describing the density of cars. It is assumed that each driver chooses his own departure time in order to minimize the sum of a departure and an arrival cost. There are N groups of drivers, The i-th group consists of κi drivers, sharing the same departure and arrival costs ϕi(t),ψi(t). For any given population sizes κ1,...,κn, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution, where no driver can lower his own total cost by choosing a different departure...
Negotiations under uncertainty.
New axiomatizations of values of TU-games using reduction properties
We propose new axiomatizations of values of cooperative games where traditional properties connected with special players (dummy, null or zero) are replaced with weaker properties relating to such participants of the game. We assume that the change of payoff of a player when combining the game with another game where this player is special is constant. Using such axioms with an additional assumption that a value is odd and-if necessary-the fairness axioms holds, one can obtain axiomatizations without...
Normalization of general coalition-games
On a game theoretical model of cooperative market
On a new solution concept for bargaining problems
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover,...
On bargaining in games
On convex combinations of two values
We study values for cooperative TU-games which are convex combinations of the Shapley value and the solidarity value, introduced in our recent paper [1]. First, we axiomatize the convex combination of the two values in the case when the coefficients are given exogenously. Next, we give an axiomatic description of the whole family of such values.
On cooperative games connected with markets
On knowledge games.
We give a formalization of the ?knowledge games? which allows to study their decidability and convergence as a problem of mathematics. Our approach is based on a metalemma analogous to those of Von Neumann and Morgenstern at the beginning of Game Theory. We are led to definitions which characterize the knowledge games as objects is standard set theory. We then study rigorously the most classical knowledge games and, although we also prove that the ?common knowledge? in these games may be incomputable,...
On solution concepts for multi-choice cooperative games.
On the complexity of problems on simple games
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand. Each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation...