Game theory in data allocation for distributed databases.
GTES : une méthode de simulation par jeux et apprentissage pour l'analyse des systèmes d'acteurs
Cet article décrit une approche de la modélisation d'un système d'acteurs, particulièrement adaptée à la modélisation des entreprises, fondée sur la théorie des jeux [11] et sur l'optimisation par apprentissage du comportement de ces acteurs. Cette méthode repose sur la combinaison de trois techniques : la simulation par échantillonnage (Monte-Carlo), la théorie des jeux pour ce qui concerne la recherche d'équilibre entre les stratégies, et les méthodes heuristiques d'optimisation locale,...
Guessing secrets.
Handling a Kullback-Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games
This paper presents a new model for computing optimal randomized security policies in non-cooperative Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) for multiple players. Our framework rests upon the extraproximal method and its extension to Markov chains, within which we explicitly compute the unique Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium of the game by employing the Lagrange method and introducing the Tikhonov regularization method. We also consider a game-theory realization of the problem that involves defenders and...
Infinite asymptotic games
We study infinite asymptotic games in Banach spaces with a finite-dimensional decomposition (F.D.D.) and prove that analytic games are determined by characterising precisely the conditions for the players to have winning strategies. These results are applied to characterise spaces embeddable into sums of finite dimensional spaces, extending results of Odell and Schlumprecht, and to study various notions of homogeneity of bases and Banach spaces. The results are related to questions of rapidity...
Maintenance in single-server queues: a game-theoretic approach.
Neural network optimal control for nonlinear system based on zero-sum differential game
In this paper, for a class of the complex nonlinear system control problems, based on the two-person zero-sum game theory, combined with the idea of approximate dynamic programming(ADP), the constrained optimization control problem is solved for the nonlinear systems with unknown system functions and unknown time-varying disturbances. In order to obtain the approximate optimal solution of the zero-sum game, the multilayer neural network is used to fit the evaluation network, the execution network...
Non-cooperative game approach to multi-robot planning
A multi-robot environment with a STRIPS representation is considered. Under some assumptions such problems can be modelled as a STRIPS language (for instance, a Block World environment) with one initial state and a disjunction of goal states. If the STRIPS planning problem is invertible, then it is possible to apply the machinery for planning in the presence of incomplete information to solve the inverted problem and then to find a solution to the original problem. In the paper a planning algorithm...
On Bellman systems without zero order term in the context of risk sensitive differential games
Bellman systems corresponding to stochastic differential games arising from a cost functional which models risk aspects are considered. Here it leads to diagonal elliptic systems without zero order term so that no simple -estimate is available.
On order locally finite and closure-preserving covers
Optimal risk sharing as a cooperative game
The problem of choosing an optimal insurance policy for an individual has recently been better understood, particularly due to the papers by Gajek and Zagrodny. In this paper we study its multi-agent version: we assume that insureds cooperate with one another to maximize their utility function. They create coalitions by bringing their risks to the pool and purchasing a common insurance contract. The resulting outcome is divided according to a certain rule called strategy. We address the fundamental...
Possible Classification of the Methods of Operational Research Applicable in the Field of Defense
Profitability analysis of price-taking strategy in disequilibrium.
Sensitivity of computer support game algorithms of safe ship control
The paper investigates the sensitivity of safe ship control to inaccurate data from the ARPA anti-collision radar system and to changes in the process control parameters. The system structure of safe ship control in collision situations and computer support programmes exploring information from the ARPA anti-collision radar are presented. Sensitivity characteristics of the multistage positional non-cooperative and cooperative game and kinematics optimization control algorithms are determined through...
Spaces defined by topological games
Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems
This paper is concerned with a security problem for a discrete-time linear networked control system of switched dynamics. The control sequence generated by a remotely located controller is transmitted over a vulnerable communication network, where the control input may be corrupted by false data injection attacks launched by a malicious adversary. Two partially conflicted cost functions are constructed as the quantitative guidelines for both the controller and the attacker, after which a switched...
The long-run dynamic of the nexus between military strength and national power: An econometric analysis.
The performance profile: A multi-criteria performance evaluation method for test-based problems
In test-based problems, solutions produced by search algorithms are typically assessed using average outcomes of interactions with multiple tests. This aggregation leads to information loss, which can render different solutions apparently indifferent and hinder comparison of search algorithms. In this paper we introduce the performance profile, a generic, domain-independent, multi-criteria performance evaluation method that mitigates this problem by characterizing the performance of a solution by...
Three-Stage Entry Game: the Strategic Effects of Advertising
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions
We present a non-cooperative union-firm wage bargaining model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout if a proposed wage contract is rejected. The innovative element that our model brings to the existing literature on wage bargaining concerns the parties’ preferences which are not expressed by constant discount rates, but by sequences of discount factors varying in time. First, we determine subgame perfect equilibria if the strike decision of the union is exogenous. We analyze...