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Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange problem

Viera Borbeľová, Katarína Cechlárová (2008)

Kybernetika

To overcome the shortage of cadaveric kidneys available for transplantation, several countries organize systematic kidney exchange programs. The kidney exchange problem can be modelled as a cooperative game between incompatible patient-donor pairs whose solutions are permutations of players representing cyclic donations. We show that the problems to decide whether a given permutation is not (weakly) Pareto optimal are NP-complete.

Parrondo's paradox.

Berresford, Geoffrey C., Rockett, Andrew M. (2003)

International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences

Partial cooperation and convex sets.

J. Enrique Romero García, Jorge J. López Vázquez (2003)

SORT

We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made up of coalition systems, in which every unit coalition is feasible and every coalition of players can be expressed as a disjoint union of maximal feasible coalitions. These systems are named partition systems and cause restricted games. To sum up, we study feasible coalition systems delined by a partial order designed for a set of players and we analyze the characteristics of a feasible coalition...

Permissive strategies : from parity games to safety games

Julien Bernet, David Janin, Igor Walukiewicz (2002)

RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications - Informatique Théorique et Applications

It is proposed to compare strategies in a parity game by comparing the sets of behaviours they allow. For such a game, there may be no winning strategy that encompasses all the behaviours of all winning strategies. It is shown, however, that there always exists a permissive strategy that encompasses all the behaviours of all memoryless strategies. An algorithm for finding such a permissive strategy is presented. Its complexity matches currently known upper bounds for the simpler problem of finding...

Permissive strategies: from parity games to safety games

Julien Bernet, David Janin, Igor Walukiewicz (2010)

RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications

It is proposed to compare strategies in a parity game by comparing the sets of behaviours they allow. For such a game, there may be no winning strategy that encompasses all the behaviours of all winning strategies. It is shown, however, that there always exists a permissive strategy that encompasses all the behaviours of all memoryless strategies. An algorithm for finding such a permissive strategy is presented. Its complexity matches currently known upper bounds for the simpler problem...

Power analysis of voting by count and account

Midori Hirokawa, Milan Vlach (2006)

Kybernetika

Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.

Problems with classical models of sex-ratio evolution

Krzysztof Argasiński (2008)

Banach Center Publications

The classical theory of the sex-ratio evolution, known as the sex-ratio game, is based on the maximization of the number of grandchildren, treated as a fitness measure of a female producing offspring of the sex ratio that is coded in her genes. The theory predicts that it is more profitable to produce offspring with less numerous sex. We can find in the literature mutually exclusive conclusions based on this prediction: some textbooks say that populations with the equal number of sons and daughters...

Production games, core deficit, duality and shadow prices

Sjur Didrik Flåm (2006)

Banach Center Publications

Considered here are production (or market) games with transferable utility. Prime objects are explicitly computable core solutions, or somewhat "deficit" versions of such, fully defined by shadow prices. Main arguments revolve around standard Lagrangian duality. A chief concern is to relax, or avoid, the commonplace assumption that all preferences and production possibilities be convex. Doing so, novel results are obtained about non-emptiness of the core, and about specific imputations therein.

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