Lacan and probability.
Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets
Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity and constrained...
Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces
The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence of equilibria...
Learning in games with bounded memory
Limit policies in N-sector dynamic growth games with externalities.
Limit theorems for Parrondo's paradox.
L'importance des réseaux en économie
Linear complementarity problems and bi-linear games
In this paper, we define bi-linear games as a generalization of the bimatrix games. In particular, we generalize concepts like the value and equilibrium of a bimatrix game to the general linear transformations defined on a finite dimensional space. For a special type of -transformation we observe relationship between the values of the linear and bi-linear games. Using this relationship, we prove some known classical results in the theory of linear complementarity problems for this type of -transformations....
Linear time-optimal control problem with incomplete information about state. Optimization of guaranteed result
Linear-quadratic differential games: from finite to infinite dimension
The object of this paper is the generalization of the pioneering work of P. Bernhard [J. Optim. Theory Appl. 27 (1979)] on two-person zero-sum games with a quadratic utility function and linear dynamics. It relaxes the semidefinite positivity assumption on the matrices in front of the state in the utility function and introduces affine feedback strategies that are not necessarily L²-integrable in time. It provides a broad conceptual review of recent results in the finite-dimensional case for which...
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