Náhodná střetnutí
Traffic flow is modeled by a conservation law describing the density of cars. It is assumed that each driver chooses his own departure time in order to minimize the sum of a departure and an arrival cost. There are N groups of drivers, The i-th group consists of κi drivers, sharing the same departure and arrival costs ϕi(t),ψi(t). For any given population sizes κ1,...,κn, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution, where no driver can lower his own total cost by choosing a different departure...
This work concerns a class of discrete-time, zero-sum games with two players and Markov transitions on a denumerable space. At each decision time player II can stop the system paying a terminal reward to player I and, if the system is no halted, player I selects an action to drive the system and receives a running reward from player II. Measuring the performance of a pair of decision strategies by the total expected discounted reward, under standard continuity-compactness conditions it is shown...
This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem....
In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined by doubly controlled reflected backward stochastic differential equations.
The main objective of this paper is to find structural conditions under which a stochastic game between two players with total reward functions has an -equilibrium. To reach this goal, the results of Markov decision processes are used to find -optimal strategies for each player and then the correspondence of a better answer as well as a more general version of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem to obtain the -equilibrium mentioned. Moreover, two examples to illustrate the theory developed are presented....
We present necessary conditions for linear noncooperative N-player delta dynamic games on an arbitrary time scale. Necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash-equilibrium and for a memoryless perfect state Nash-equilibrium are proved.
In this paper, for a class of the complex nonlinear system control problems, based on the two-person zero-sum game theory, combined with the idea of approximate dynamic programming(ADP), the constrained optimization control problem is solved for the nonlinear systems with unknown system functions and unknown time-varying disturbances. In order to obtain the approximate optimal solution of the zero-sum game, the multilayer neural network is used to fit the evaluation network, the execution network...
We propose new axiomatizations of values of cooperative games where traditional properties connected with special players (dummy, null or zero) are replaced with weaker properties relating to such participants of the game. We assume that the change of payoff of a player when combining the game with another game where this player is special is constant. Using such axioms with an additional assumption that a value is odd and-if necessary-the fairness axioms holds, one can obtain axiomatizations without...
Impartial Solitaire Clobber is a one-player version of the combinatorial game Clobber, introduced by Albert et al. in 2002. The initial configuration of Impartial Solitaire Clobber is a graph, such that there is a stone placed on each of its vertex, each stone being black or white. A move of the game consists in picking a stone, and clobbering an adjacent stone of the opposite color. By clobbering we mean that the clobbered stone is removed from the graph, and replaced by the clobbering one....